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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Responderi_t,
-v-

RAYMOND JOE VIGIL,

Case No. 18118

Defendant-Appeilant.

. BRIEF OF AP.PELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appeilant, Raymond Joe Vigil, appeals from his
conviction of the crimes of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree
felony, and Attempted Criminal Homicide, a second degree
felony, and the judgments thereof in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Raymond Joe Vigil, was tried and convicted
by a jury of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and
Attempted Criminal Homicide, a second degree felony.

Appellant

was sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life,
and an indeterminate term of one year to five years, such
sentences to run concurrently.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered by
the Court below and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about July 26, 1981, at about 10:30 p.m., the
Winchell's Doughnut Shop loca.ted at 1465 South State 'Street in
Salt Lake City, Utah, was robbed by two Mexican-American men,
one of whom carried a firearm.

The two men were seen exiting a

yellow Pinto automobile with Idaho license plates prior to their
entry into the store.· ·Testimony at trial was that the driver
of the automobile remained in the car.

Some moments later, after

the incident had been reported to the 'Salt Lake City Police, a
Salt Lake City Police ·car followed and subsequently pursued a
yellow Pinto with Idaho license plates being driven by the
appellant Raymond Joe Vigil, while it was proceeding west on
17th South Street.

The automobile made a right-hand turn onto

a side street and stopped at the command of the officer.

Back-up

police units then arrived and the officers emerged from the
police cars with shotguns and service revolvers pointed at the
Pinto automobile.

As one of the occupants of the automobile

attempted to get out of the car, the officers told all occupants
to remain in the car.

The Pinto then drove away at a high rate

of speed toward the end of the dead-end street it had entered.
Two Salt Lake City Police cars then blocked the pathway of the
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vehicle.

As the vehicle made a U-turn and turned towards the

police cars, gunfire ensued, the Pinto stopped, and the occupants
exited the car and fled.

The appellant, Raymond Vigil, was

arrested having been located in a backyard in the general
vicinity.

A gun was located in another yard, and subsequently

two suspects·, Rudy Duran and Leo Duran, were arrested in the
vicinity, one ·suspect ·being in possession of money believed to
have been stoleri from Winchell's .. · At the preliminary hearing of
the ·three ·defendants·, Rudy Duran and Leo Duran were positively
identified by the ·employee· of Winchell's Doughnuts as the persons
who committed the robbery.

Appellant was not identified by the

Winchell's ·employee as having been a participant in the robbery
nor was the appellant ·identified by a witness in the parking
lot who claims to have seen three men in the Pinto prior to
two of the men getting out of the car and going around to the
front of Winchell's Doughnuts.

Prior to the beginning of the

trial scheduled for all three ·defendants, defendants Leo Duran
and Rudy Duran, both parolees from the Utah State Prison, entered
pleas of guilty to Attempted Criminal Homicide, felonies of the
second degree, as a result of plea negotiations, and were
sentenced to the ·utah State Prison for terms of from one to
fifteen years rather than for sentences of from five to life
as mandated if their pleas had been to the first degree felony
of Aggravated Robbery.

Appellant then stood trial alone.

Defense ·counsel presented the testimony of Leo Duran,
who indicated that he and his brother, Rudy, had committed the
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armed robbery of Win.chell' s Doughnut shop, after
a car belonging to appellant''S girlfriend.

havi~g

borrowed

Duran testified

that after having committed the robbery, they returned to a
party nearby which was being attended by Mr. Vigil, and asked
him to accompany them. 'It was after having picked up Mr. Vigil
that the ·encounter with the police officers occurred.

Mr. Duran

further testified that Mr. Vigil began driving the car after
he was picked up at the ·party and that he, Mr. Duran, was the
only person involved in an exchange of gunfire with police
officers.
At trial, during closing arguments, defense counsel sought
to comment about the

·plea_ba~gain

entered into by the Durans

insofar as it affected the evidence against the appellant.

The

prosecutor· obj e·cted to this ·line of argument and was sustained.
Then, in rebuttal, .the prosecutor commented on the same plea
bargain stating that, because a guilty plea had been entered,
that the jury could consider that as an admission of guilt; that
such a crime was in fact committed.
and was overruled.

Defense counsel objected

Counsel then made a motion for a mistrial

based on the prose·cutor • s argument which was denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CO:MMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO COMMENT ON THE GUILTY
PLEA OF THE CO-DEFENDANTS WHILE NOT ALLOWING
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL TO ALSO COMMENT ON THE PLEA.

-4-
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Evidence of a plea ba:r-gain was brought out at trial by
the testimony of· Leo Duran.

He ·testified that he and Rudy Duran

accepted a plea bargain wherein they would plead. guilty to the
second degree felony, Attempted Criminal Homicide, and in doing
so, the first degree ·felony Aggravated Robbery would be dropped.

In State ·v. Va'ldez·,· 30 Utah ·2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973),
the Utah court discussed the

r~ght

of both sides to argue the

evidence 'from their respective ·standpoints:·
Counsel for both sides· have considerable
latitude ·in their arguments to the jury;
they have ·a rightto discuss fully from
their standpoints the ·evidence and the
inferences and deductions arising therefrom. The ·tes·t of whether the remarks
made by counsel are ·so objectionable as
to merit a reversal in a criminal case
is, did the reniarks call to the ·attention
of the jurors matters which they would
not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under
the circumstances· of the ·particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks. The
determination of' whether the improper remarks have influenced a verdict is within
the sound discretion of the 'trial court
on motion for a new trial. 513 P.2d at
426.
This view was re-emphasized in State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d
1298, 1301 (Utah 1976).

In Gaxiola, the prosecutor's statements

were found to be ·in response· to the strong advocacy of defense
counsel in his closing argument, and were within the range of
reasonable inferences which could be drawn from the evidence.
In the instant case, defense counsel was prevented from
commenting as to the ·plea bargain entered into by the Durans, as
testified to by Leo Duran.

Appellant stood trial alone after the
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pleas taken by the Durans, even though he was also offered the
.

-

-

opportunity to enter a plea of guilty to the second degree offense
of Attempted Criminal Homicide.·

Therefore, the· circumstances

leading up to the ·pleas of the Durans with ·the resulting sentencing ramifications were ·definitely important factors bearing
on the ·appellant's stance at his trial.
Charged with Aggravated Robbery and Attempted Criminal
Homicide,· the ·nurans pled. guilty to the ·1atter charge, a second
degree felony. ·It was obvious from the testimony of Leo Duran
that he ·and Rudy Duran had committed the armed robbery yet a plea
was offered and accep.ted res.ulting in the dismissal of the first
degree ·felony charge altogether.

It is perfectly reasonable to

assume,· and from a defense point of view, a reasonable inference
and deduction to be ·drawn, that the plea bargain was accepted by
the ·Durans because 'the· Aggravated Robbery, the first degree felony,
would be dismissed, resulting in the lesser maximum penalty of from
1 to 15 years.

Considering the evidence against the Durans,

having the ·first degree felony dismissed was certainly a bargain.
More importantly, considering the lack of evidence against the
appellant for the robbery and the disputed facts regarding the
Attempted Criminal Homicide, defendant's. right to explain the
ramifications ·of the plea bargain in closing was very important.
Defense· counse·l should have been allowed to tell the jury how
those "pleas affected the

evidenc~

or lack of evidence, against the

appellant . · This turns out to be most important in light of the
prosecutor•s subsequent comments.
Va1dez· 'states that both sides have the right to argue
fully the ·evidence ·and the inferences and deductions arising
~
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therefrom.

This means defense counsel had the

r~ght

to alert

the jury as to the ·motivation· the Durans had in entering the
guilty plea.

Without such an explanation, the jury might well

think the guilty plea only meant they were undoubtedly guilty.
This is mis leading and may we·11 have ·influenced the verdict
against the ·appellant. ·Appellant 'had the right to inform the
jury that othe·r reasons may well have prompted the plea such
as the: ·assurance ·that the Durans would not be facing a conviction
for a first ·degree 'felony.
It is common knowledge ·that plea bargains are offered
to defendants

not because ·the "State is benevolent and forgiving,

but because of weaknesses or -.problem in the case.
h~d

If the State

a strong case against ·each of the defendants charged, it

pres·umably would not have ·made such an offer.

Dismissal of a

first degree· ·felony is a significant gesture.
The prosecutor's comment did exactly what Valdez cautions
against.

By commenting that the plea meant the crime had in

fact beeri committed, that remark called to the jurors' attention
a matter which was not necessarily justified, and which probably
influenced their decision in assessing the evidence against the
appellant -- the same ·evidence that prompted the State to offer
a plea and drop the Aggravated Robbery charge.

By allowing the

prosecutor to make this comment, and not allowing defense counse 1
to comment regarding another inference or deduction that could
be drawn from the· plea, the court committed reversible error
causing preJudice to appellant.

-7-
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In Lewis v.· State, 569 P.2d 486, 489 (Okla. 1977),
defendants' conviction was reversed because the ·prosecutor
sugges.ted, among other
defendants had the

thi~gs,

stol~ri

....

that the mere ·fact that the

credit cards in their

posse~sion

.-

or

prose·cutor neglected to include other portions of the applicable

...
··"
:::

rule of law that would have clarified his misstatement.

..:-:-.:.

control created the pres.tnnption that they were guilty.

is analogous ·to the ·pres·ent situation.

There, the

Lewis

Here, the prosecutor

sugges.ted to the jury that the guilty plea was conclusive that
the crime had been committed.

.-·.-,--

He neglected to tell the jury about

the ·ramifications of. the Durans' res.pective pleas.
misstated what the 'plea really meant.·

In effect, he

Defense counsel attempted

--

'":··

to insure· ·that the jury was fully informed but was prevented

from doing so. ·The prose·cutor cannot be blamed for
defense~oriented

to make ·a

perfectly willing --

hes~tating

statement, but defense counsel was

--.

..
........

and should have been allowed .__ to present

-

....

..:..

the reasonable deduction arising from Leo Duran's testimony
about the ·guilty plea.

~

-

Othe·r courts have spoken on the importance of fair
arguments.

InHafen·v. p·e·aple, 492 P.2d 847 (Colo. 1970),

the 'district attorney's remarks were found to be a fair response
to defense counsel's. arguments·.

The court said the provoked

·-

~

arguments were ·permissible. ·Here, the ·prosecutor's. comment was
initial, not provoked.

Defense ·counse·l was prevented from making

the ·argument that would have "provoked" the prosecutor's comment.
In Gr·ee·n:· v. State, 611 P.2d 262 (Okla. 1980), the court
said that both sides may discuss fully from their standpoints the

-8-
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.........

~

evidence and inferences and deductions arising therefrom.
However, that right does not permit the prosecutor to bolster
his argumerit by implications which are unsupported by competent
evidence ·offered at trial. ·Here, the ·prosecutor improperly
bolstered hfs argument. ·While ·it is true ·that guilty pleas have
the same effect as an admission of guilt, there was no competent
evidence

:irf

this case· .that the Durans pled guilty because they

admitted the offense. ·The only evidence on the subject was
Duran's. tes.timony that indicated they pled to get the robbery
charge ·dropped.
The jury received only one side of the story in the
closing arguments.

Defense counsel elicited from Leo Duran the

fact of the ·plea bargain and that the robbery was dismissed.
This ·was not objectionable.

Although the·plea did not involve

the ·defendant (in fact, he rejected the offer), it nevertheless
had an effect on the ·evidence the jury considered in convicting
him.

Counsel should have been allowed to incorporate that

evidence 'into her closing argument and argue the reasonable
inferences that followed from it.
If the court was correct in disallowing defense counsel's
cormnerit, then it erred in allowing the prosecutor to comment on
the opposing side of the argument.

If it was correct in allowing

the prosecutor's. com.merit, .then it erred in disallowing defense
counsel's. comment.

In either instance, the court erred.
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CONCLUS'ION
Valdez ·allows ·each side ·to argue 'the reasonable inferences
and deduction·s to be drawn from the ·evidence.

Here, defense

counsel was prevented froni doing so while the prosecutor was
allowed to cb ·so.

The effect was prejudicial because the jury

heard only the' 'state's. infer'ences and deductions and was prevented
from hearing the ·defense's. inferences and deductions.

The

obvious error· in this situation mandates that the conviction be
set aside since the one-·sided

that the jury

aniside~fJ"in

DATED this

·t7<0·

comm~nt

had an effect on the evidence

reaching their verdict.

day of June, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of
the foregoing Brief to the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake. City, Utah, 84114, this
June, 1982.
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